Judges And Democratization

Judiciaries must be politically impartial and immune from political interference if democracy is to be consolidated in countries in transition from authoritarian rule. Without an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law there can be no democracy. Judges and Democratization is based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence, and the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. It examines the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary by post-authoritarian constitutions. Judicial activism raises concerns that the legitimate authority of elected legislatures is being usurped. Consequently, demands have been voiced to make the judiciary more accountable. Judges and Democratization asks how such accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms..

Judiciaries must be politically impartial and immune from political interference if democracy is to be consolidated in countries in transition from authoritarian rule. Without an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law there can be no democracy. Judges and Democratization is based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence, and the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. It examines the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary by post-authoritarian constitutions. The book asks how, in the context of this endowed authority, such accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This text will be of key interest to teachers and students of politics, comparative government/politics, combined politics and law, democracy and governance, human rights and democratization, and democratic development..

Introduction : the accountability function of courts in new democracies / Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella, and Elin Skaar Judicial review in developed democracies / Martin Shapiro How some reflections on the United States' experience may inform African efforts to build court systems and the rule of law / Jennifer Widner The constitutional court and control of presidential extraordinary powers in Colombia / Rodrigo Uprimny The politics of judicial review in Chile in the era of domestic transition, 1990-2002 / Javier A. Couso Legitimating transformation : political resource allocation in the South African constitutional court / Theunis Roux The accountability function of courts in Tanzania and Zambia / Siri Gloppen Renegotiating "law and order" : judicial reform and citizen responses in post-war Guatemala / Rachel Sieder Economic reform and judicial governance in Brazil : balancing independence with accountability / Carlos Santiso In search of a democratic justice what courts should not do : Argentina, 1983-2002 / Roberto Gargarella Lessons learned and the way forward / Irwin P. Stotzky..

New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing 'insurance' to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy..

Judiciaries must be politically impartial and immune from political interference if democracy is to be consolidated in countries in transition from authoritarian rule. Without an independent judiciary there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law there can be no democracy. Judges and Democratization is based on the premise that democracy cannot be consolidated without the rule of law of which judicial independence is an indispensable part. It pays particular attention to the restraints placed upon judicial independence, and the reforms which are being applied, or remain to be adopted, in order to guard against the different kinds of interference which prevent judicial decisions being taken in a wholly impartial way. It examines the paradox of judicial activism arising from the independence endowed upon the judiciary by post-authoritarian constitutions. The book asks how, in the context of this endowed authority, such accountability can be made compatible with the preservation of judicial independence when the concept of an accountable, independent judiciary appears to be a contradiction in terms. This text will be of key interest to teachers and students of politics, comparative government/politics, combined politics and law, democracy and governance, human rights and democratization, and democratic development..

Ece Temelkuran’s review on Mehmet Gün’s “Turkey’s Middle Democracy Issues and How to Solve Them: Judiciary, Accountability and Fair Representation” The first time I saw a Tunisian taxi driver counting money in French I was puzzled to hear it – it was someone speaking to himself in a foreign language as if it was his mother tongue. Observing mothers talking to their babies in English in Egypt or Lebanese lovers having a passionate fight in French, got me thinking about how deeply colonialism can be encrypted in individuals’ souls and how Turkish people have no clue about such a predicament. It certainly does not mean that citizens of Turkey have a healthy mental and emotional relationship with the West. After all, we all grew up with the same map in our classrooms in which Turkey was standing between the West, with all kinds of colors, rivers and romantic sounding cities and the East, illustrated as a greyish-yellowish void. The map was the portrayal of the Republic’s worldview, which had set the ideological goal for future generations: forget about the East that we once reigned and look towards the West where all the lively colors and the higher ideals of humankind are. Our psyche was and still is as if in a vacuum – constantly pulled and pushed by the either side of the bridge. Thanks to such a problematic in-betweenness, telling the story of this bridge requires the storyteller to wrestle with several moral questions, the most important one of them being “Am I compromising my country’s dignity or my pride by complaining about my land to the West?” This is a conundrum that neither the countries with an imperial past nor the previously colonized countries have to deal with. And the storyteller has to make a fine distinction between the words of pride and dignity when he decides to speak the whole truth. In “Turkey’s Middle Democracy Problem”, Mehmet Gün begins to tell the truth by portraying this question and makes it clear where he stands, “I would not wish the publishing of my book in English in London to be perceived as a call for help, because Turkey is mature enough to identify and analyze its own problems and implement its own solutions.” The book sets out its stance from the very beginning by challenging the dominant idea that the West is the sole pioneer and the patron of such concepts dwelling in the pre-Islamic Turkish state tradition, while providing examples from the ancient understanding of separation of powers and the philosophy of justice in Turkic history. Gün takes one step even further and as a man of law he sets out to offer solutions to the recently globalized problem of the rule of law and authoritarianism with historic references to the shared past of the East and the West. When the book turns to today’s Turkey, Gün focuses on two main problems that recently began to be relevant for Western democracies as well: accountability and transparency. Among his several important suggestions for maintaining accountability and transparency in democracies one might be particularly invigorating not only for Turkey but also for Western countries where rising authoritarianism begins to threaten these two ideals. Gün suggests establishing a Supreme Council of Justice that includes all the participants of the judicial system in order to fortify justice. For those who are used to seeing an increasing number of political science books on Turkey, Gün’s take on the country through the concepts of law, economy and philosophy brings a fresh breath to the literature. In Gün’s view Turkey has fallen into the trap of “middle democracy”. He borrows the economic term “middle income trap” and explains how a country’s democracy can also diminish over time when higher political standards are not pursued by the state and its society. The book elaborates on the problem by covering a wide spectrum of topics, from the economy to the problems of the inner workings of NGOs in Turkish democracy. This wide spectrum provides the reader with a global view of the country rather than digging deeper only in single area. This ambitious and passionate attempt to tell the whole story of Turkey should be regarded not solely as an individual endeavor. Mehmet Gün is a lawyer, and the founder and the president of Better Justice Association, a respected organization composed of lawyers, legal academics, former judges and others which is rapidly attracting interest from young law students, in particular, from across Turkey, and he is in close touch with several NGOs in Anatolia. The executive summary of the book has been adopted as a policy document by Türkonfed – The Confederation of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Business World- which represents small and medium businesses all over Turkey, and received positive feedback and emphatic agreement from a range of business stakeholders when it was put to them. Therefore the book might better be viewed as the total sum of myriad voices from Turkey that are rarely heard. The book should also be regarded as a moral and political stance against the idea that has been dominant in Western political and intellectual circles for the last two decades: that Turkey is an oriental country that can and should be content with less democracy under an authoritarian regime. Gün’s voice should be heard as the voice of Anatolia –not Istanbul, for a change- that as a matter of fact lasted longer than any sultan. A voice coming to London bearing gifts..

One of the most contentious issues in politics today is the propriety of electing judges. Ought judges be independent of democratic processes in obtaining and retaining their seats, or should they be subject to the approval of the electorate and the processes that accompany popular control? While this debate is interesting and often quite heated, it usually occurs without reference to empirical facts--or at least accurate ones. Also, empirical scholars to date have refused to take a position on the normative issues surrounding the practice. Bonneau and Hall offer a fresh new approach. Using almost two decades of data on state supreme court elections, Bonneau and Hall argue that opponents of judicial elections have made—and continue to make—erroneous empirical claims. They show that judicial elections are efficacious mechanisms that enhance the quality of democracy and create an inextricable link between citizens and the judiciary. In so doing, they pioneer the use of empirical data to shed light on these normative questions and offer a coherent defense of judicial elections. This provocative book is essential reading for anyone interested in the politics of judicial selection, law and politics, or the electoral process. Part of the Controversies in Electoral Democracy and Representation series edited by Matthew J. Streb..

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Lewis, Texas A&M University * Chien-Chih Lin, Academia Sinica, Taiwan * Sunita Parikh, Washington University in St. Louis * Russell Smyth, Monash University, Australia * Christopher Zorn, Pennsylvania State UniversityConstitutionalism and Democracy.

The book offers articles by senior jurists on important aspects of judicial independence and judicial process in many jurisdictions, including indicators of justice. It comes at the time of serious challenges to the judiciary, the rule of law and democracy..

Chiefly papers originally presented at Guiding the Rule of Law into the 21st Century, a conference held Apr. 16-17, 1999 at the University of Ottawa..

The rule of law is frequently invoked in political debate, yet rarely defined with any precision. Some employ it as a synonym for democracy, others for the subordination of the legislature to a written constitution and its judicial guardians. It has been seen as obedience to the duly-recognised government, a form of governing through formal and general rule-like laws and the rule of principle. Given this diversity of view, it is perhaps unsurprising that certain scholars have regarded the concept as no more than a self-congratulatory rhetorical device. This collection of eighteen key essays from jurists, political theorists and public law political scientists, aims to explore the role law plays in the political system. The introduction evaluates their arguments. The first eleven essays identify the standard features associated with the rule of law. These are held to derive less from any characteristics of law per se than from a style of legislating and judging that gives equal consideration to all citizens. The next seven essays then explore how different ways of separating and dispersing power contribute to this democratic style of rule by forcing politicians and judges alike to treat people as equals and regard none as above the law..

This important collection of articles, contributed by eminent scholars, judges & legal practitioners, addresses the fundamental issues of human rights, democracy, the rule of law & Islam. It covers a broad & diverse range of topics & discusses key issues & questions such as: . What lessons should emerging democracies learn from mature democracies in the promotion of human rights & respect for the rule of law? . Are democratic processes & human rights standards in the developed world really models that should be adopted by developing countries? . How are human rights protected in Islam & the Middle East? . What is Islamic constitutionalism & how does Islamic law provide for a democratic system of government? The book argues that the development of the rule of law, democracy & respect for human rights should be a process of interaction & integration on a global scale. In addition, it stresses that the integration of previously closed societies into the process of globalisation must take into account the indigenous traditions already existing in such societies, & the extent to which they will contribute to, & benefit from, the process as a whole..

An independent judiciary is considered an indication of a developing nation’s level of democracy.

A liberal state is a representative democracy constrained by the rule of law. Richard Posner argues for a conception of the liberal state based on pragmatic theories of government. He views the actions of elected officials as guided by interests rather than by reason and the decisions of judges by discretion rather than by rules. He emphasizes the institutional and material, rather than moral and deliberative, factors in democratic decision making. Posner argues that democracy is best viewed as a competition for power by means of regular elections. Citizens should not be expected to play a significant role in making complex public policy regarding, say, taxes or missile defense. The great advantage of democracy is not that it is the rule of the wise or the good but that it enables stability and orderly succession in government and limits the tendency of rulers to enrich or empower themselves to the disadvantage of the public. Posner’s theory steers between political theorists’ concept of deliberative democracy on the left and economists’ public-choice theory on the right. It makes a significant contribution to the theory of democracy—and to the theory of law as well, by showing that the principles that inform Schumpeterian democratic theory also inform the theory and practice of adjudication. The book argues for law and democracy as twin halves of a pragmatic theory of American government..

Presents a collection of essays that provide an examination of the judicial branch of the American government, including its history, its imapct, and its future..

In the Indian context..