Judges And Judging In The History Of The Common Law And Civil Law

In this collection of essays, leading legal historians address significant topics in the history of judges and judging, with comparisons not only between British, American and Commonwealth experience, but also with the judiciary in civil law countries. It is not the law itself, but the process of law-making in courts that is the focus of inquiry. Contributors describe and analyse aspects of judicial activity, in the widest possible legal and social contexts, across two millennia. The essays cover English common law, continental customary law and ius commune, and aspects of the common law system in the British Empire. The volume is innovative in its approach to legal history. None of the essays offer straight doctrinal exegesis; none take refuge in old-fashioned judicial biography. The volume is a selection of the best papers from the 18th British Legal History Conference..

"More than two hundred legal historians, from every corner of the globe, met in Oxford at the Eighteenth British Legal History Conference in early July 2007 to hear and present papers on the history of "judges and judging". A selection of the papers presented at the conference has now been revised and edited to form the chapters of this volume. Perhaps the theme of the conference and of this publication needs some initial explanation. The Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s rightly questioned the pre-eminence given to the study of decision-making in the courts in American legal education, and similar ideas have entered British and Commonwealth legal education in the past generation; the utterances of judges are not taken as the sum of, or even the core of, the law. But this is hardly news for legal historians. They have long been effortless, even naively unselfconscious, Realists, always concerned to understand the making of the law within the context of its time, with due attention to the society in which law is embedded and the shifting mentalities of professionals and other players in the legal system"--.

Leading historical research analysing the history of judges and judging, allowing comparisons between British, American, Commonwealth and Civil Law jurisdictions..

Does gender matter in judging? And if so, in what way? Why were there so few women judges only two or three decades ago, and why are there so many now in most countries of the Western world? How do women judges experience their work in a previously male-dominated environment? What are their professional careers? How do they organise and live their lives? And, finally and most notably: do women judge differently from men (or even better)? These are the questions dealt with in this collection of contributions by seven authors from six countries (UK, Australia, USA, Canada, Syria and Argentina), contrasting views from common law and civil law countries. In spite of differences in the two legal systems, as well as greater gender diversity on the bench and the overall higher income and prestige enjoyed by judges in common law countries, women judges in all these countries – Syria included – share many problems. Diverse and intriguing facets are added to a debate that started thirty years ago but continues to leave ample space for further discussion. This book was originally published as a special issue of International Journal of the Legal Profession.

Although the problem of ratio decidendi concerns the essence of law and justice, very little comparative work between the Continental and Anglo-American legal systems has been done on the topic. Legal literature often repeats that it is one of the sharpest points of contrast between the two legal cultures. Within the English speaking legal system, multiple opinions, both concurring and dissenting, prevail where dissent among Continental judges only occurs behind closed doors: the published decision indeed is always presented as the single and incontestable opinion of the whole court. Historical reasons are generally put forward to explain that contrast. Where in the Anglo-American Common Law system judges are asked - and always have been asked - to present the materials and reasons upon which they based their judicial opinions, in Ancien Regime continental Europe it was not considered necessary to formulate the reasons of a decision and in most courts of the European Continent it was even formally forbidden to the judges, until the end of the eighteenth century, to write down or even communicate orally the secrets of their discussions and deliberations. To comparatists, this reveals two different cultures among judges and lawyers. In Continental Europe there is much emphasis on the idea of judging as a science which can be learned and reproduced with an impersonal rigour. The Anglo-American judge is not considered to be such a trained scientist, he is merely a practised craftsman. Can the history of ratio decidendi - but also the history of law and justice from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century - therefore be reduced to a total contradiction between two legal cultures?.

Philip Hamburger’s Law and Judicial Duty traces the early history of what is today called “judicial review.” Working from previously unexplored evidence, Hamburger questions the very concept of judicial review. Although decisions holding statutes unconstitutional are these days considered instances of a distinct judicial power of review, Hamburger shows that they were once understood merely as instances of a broader judicial duty. The book’s focus on judicial duty overturns the familiar debate about judicial power. The book is therefore essential reading for anyone concerned about the proper role of the judiciary. Hamburger lays the foundation for his argument by explaining the common law ideals of law and judicial duty. He shows that the law of the land was understood to rest on the authority of the lawmaker and that what could not be discerned within the law of the land was not considered legally binding. He then shows that judges had a duty to decide in accord with the law of the land. These two ideals—law and judicial duty—together established and limited what judges could do. By reviving an understanding of these common law ideals, Law and Judicial Duty calls into question the modern assumption that judicial review is a power within the judges’ control. Indeed, the book shows that what is currently considered a distinct power of review was once understood as a matter of duty—the duty of judges to decide in accord with the law of the land. The book thereby challenges the very notion of judicial review. It shows that judges had authority to hold government acts unconstitutional, but that they enjoyed this power only to the extent it was required by their duty. In laying out the common law ideals, and in explaining judicial review as an aspect of judicial duty, Law and Judicial Duty reveals a very different paradigm of law and of judging than prevails today. The book, moreover, sheds new light on a host of misunderstood problems, including intent, manifest contradiction, the status of foreign and international law, the cases and controversies requirement, and the authority of judicial precedent..

From the trial of Socrates to the post-9/11 military commissions, trials have always been useful instruments of politics. Yet there is still much that we do not understand about them. Why do governments use trials to pursue political objectives, and when? What differentiates political trials from ordinary ones? Contrary to conventional wisdom, not all political trials are show trials or contrive to set up scapegoats. This volume offers a novel account of political trials that is empirically rigorous and theoretically sophisticated, linking state-of-the-art research on telling cases to a broad argument about political trials as a socio-legal phenomenon. All the contributors analyse the logic of the political in the courtroom. From archival research to participant observation, and from linguistic anthropology to game theory, the volume offers a genuinely interdisciplinary set of approaches that substantially advance existing knowledge about what political trials are, how they work, and why they matter..

The publication of Scholars of Tort Law marks the beginning of a long overdue rebalancing of private law scholarship. Instead of concentrating on judicial decisions and academic commentary only for what that commentary says about judicial decisions, the book explores the contributions of scholars of tort law in their own right. The work of a selection of leading scholars of tort law from across the common law world, ranging from Thomas Cooley (1824–1898) to Patrick Atiyah (1931–2018), is addressed by eminent current scholars in the field. The focus of the contributions is on the nature of the work produced by each of the scholars in question, important influences on their work, and the influence which that work in turn had on thinking about tort law. The process of subjecting tort law scholarship to sustained analysis provides new insights into the intellectual development of tort law and reveals the important role played by scholars in that development. By focusing on the work of influential tort scholars, the book serves to emphasise the importance of legal scholarship to the development of the common law more generally..

This book examines the view of women held by medieval common lawyers and legislators, and considers medieval women’s treatment by and participation in the processes of the common law. Surveying a wide range of points of contact between women and the common law, from their appearance (or not) in statutes, through their participation (or not) as witnesses, to their treatment as complainants or defendants, it argues for closer consideration of women within the standard narratives of classical legal history, and for re-examination of some previous conclusions on the relationship between women and the common law. It will appeal to scholars and students of medieval history, as well as those interested in legal history, gender studies and the history of women..

The contributions to this volume are concerned with the Roman law of antiquity in its broadest sense, covering both private and public law from the Roman Republic to the Byzantine era, including legal papyrology. They also examine the reception of Roman law in Western Europe and its colonies (specifically the Dutch East Indies) from the Middle Ages to the promulgation of the German Burgerliche Gesetzbuch in 1900. They reflect the wide interests of Professor Boudewijn Sirks, whom the volume honours on the occasion of his retirement and whose work and career have transcended frontiers and nations..

This book showcases eight judges that exemplify judicial greatness and looks at what role they play in law and society..

This book explores the foundations and evolution of modern corporate fiduciary law in the United States and the United Kingdom. Today US and UK fiduciary law provide very different approaches to the regulation of directorial behaviour. However, as the book shows, the law in both jurisdictions borrowed from the same sources in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English fiduciary and commercial law. The book identifies the shared legal foundations and authorities and explores the drivers of corporate fiduciary law's contemporary divergence. In so doing it challenges the prevailing accounts of corporate legal change and stability in the US and the UK..

In the common law world, Albert Venn Dicey (1835–1922) is known as the high priest of orthodox constitutional theory, as an ideological and nationalistic positivist. In his analytical coldness, his celebration of sovereign power, and his incessant drive to organize and codify legal rules separate from moral values or political realities, Dicey is an uncanny figure. This book challenges this received view of Dicey. Through a re-examination of his life and his 1885 book Law of the Constitution, the high priest Dicey is defrocked and a more human Dicey steps forward to offer alternative ways of reading his canonical text, who struggled to appreciate law as a form of reasoned discourse that integrates values of legality and authority through methods of ordinary legal interpretation. The result is a unique common law constitutional discourse through which assertions of sovereign power are conditioned by moral aspirations associated with the rule of law..

Fully revised and updated, this classic text provides the authoritative introduction to the history of the English common law. The book traces the development of the principal features of English legal institutions and doctrines from Anglo-Saxon times to the present and, combined with Baker and Milsom's Sources of Legal History, offers invaluable insights into the development of the common law of persons, obligations, and property, and also of criminal and public law. It is an essential reference point for all lawyers, historians and students seeking to understand the evolution of English law over a millennium. The book provides an introduction to the main characteristics, institutions, and doctrines of English law over the longer term - particularly the evolution of the common law before the extensive statutory changes and regulatory regimes of the last two centuries. It explores how legal change was brought about in the common law and how judges and lawyers managed to square evolution with respect for inherited wisdom..

Law and Society in England 1750–1950 is an indispensable text for those wishing to study English legal history and to understand the foundations of the modern British state. In this new updated edition the authors explore the complex relationship between legal and social change. They consider the ways in which those in power themselves imagined and initiated reform and the ways in which they were obliged to respond to demands for change from outside the legal and political classes. What emerges is a lively and critical account of the evolution of modern rights and expectations, and an engaging study of the formation of contemporary social, administrative and legal institutions and ideas, and the road that was travelled to create them. The book is divided into eight chapters: Institutions and Ideas; Land; Commerce and Industry; Labour Relations; The Family; Poverty and Education; Accidents; and Crime. This extensively referenced analysis of modern social and legal history will be invaluable to students and teachers of English law, political science, and social history..

This historically embedded treatment of theoretical debates about prerogative and reason of state spans over four centuries of constitutional development. Commencing with the English Civil War and the constitutional theories of Hobbes and the Republicans, it moves through eighteenth-century arguments over jealousy of trade and commercial reason of state to early imperial concerns and the nineteenth-century debate on the legislative empire, to martial law and twentieth-century articulations of the state at the end of empire. It concludes with reflections on the contemporary post-imperial security state. The book synthesises a wealth of theoretical and empirical literature that allows a link to be made between the development of constitutional ideas and global realpolitik. It exposes the relationship between internal and external pressures and designs in the making of the modern constitutional polity and explores the relationship between law, politics and economics in a way that remains rare in constitutional scholarship..

In From Recognition to Reconciliation, twenty leading scholars reflect on the continuing transformation of the constitutional relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state..